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on a high plane and with much logical precision; but here, as throughout the latter part of the book, one has an increasing impression that problems of the most vital character and of ultimate importance are being considered too much in the abstract, and that the solutions arrived at are too much in terms of 'general principles' that would apply almost equally well to a world very different in its concrete nature from the one in which we live. All the present unrest in philosophy,—the demand for at least a partial reformulation of the old problems even on the part of those who sympathize least with the extravagances of certain recent innovators,—evidently seems to Professor Bosanquet little more than a gratuitous vexation of the spirit, a prolonged bad dream from which we must necessarily awake at last. But it is particularly unfortunate that one of the most distinguished exponents of traditional idealism, while insisting that the perpetual transmutation of the lower into the higher forms of experience is not only perfectly intelligible but the very life and meaning of our ideal experience, should himself be content to repeat the same 'general' and traditional solutions of problems that, in their specific and living character, are bound to vary with the increase of scientific knowledge and the emergence of new and unexpected phases of our contemporary civilization.

Professor Bosanquet's Gifford Lectures for 1912, *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, recently published and forming the sequel to the present volume, will be noticed in a later number of the PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. It may be mentioned that the author's general title for the two series of lectures is *Individuality and Destiny*.

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Thought and Things. A Study of the Development and Meaning of Thought or *Genetic Logic*. Vol. III. *Interest and Art*, being *Real Logic*, I. *Genetic Epistemology*. By JAMES MARK BALDWIN. London, George Allen & Co., Ltd.; New York, The Macmillan Company, 1911.—pp. xvi, 284.

The field of genetic logic, as surveyed by Professor Baldwin, comprises three main divisions: Functional Logic, which, in its genetic account of knowledge, exhibits the means and processes by which the mind becomes conscious of its logical nature, and thus establishes within experience itself that great dualism of controls, inner and outer, which underlies the procedure of science and which issues in the logical mode in the opposition of subject and object; secondly, Experimental Logic, which concerns itself with the logical stage of experience,

treating genetically the processes of judgment, their meaning for consciousness, their sanctions, and their limitations as defined by the various dualisms which they are unable to overcome; and, finally, Real Logic, which investigates the meaning of the reality that is assumed, revealed, and presupposed by the various conscious processes as they emerge in the development of mind—Genetic Epistemology—and discusses then the meaning which “all the sorts of ‘real’” have in common and what each contributes to the final meaning of reality—Genetic Morphology. Since the processes of reflection are found inherently incapable of establishing the unity of experience, Real Logic carries us on to the hyperlogical in an attempt to develop a “reasoned form of *Æsthetic Immediatism*” called *Pancalism*. The detailed discussion of this doctrine, however, and the problems of Genetic Morphology have been reserved for a further volume, to appear shortly, the author finding himself unable to carry out his original intention of treating Real Logic, as he has Functional Logic and Experimental Logic, within the compass of a single volume. We have before us at this time, therefore, merely the Genetic Epistemology—an account of the various modes of mediate and immediate experience from the point of view of the reality which they implicate throughout the various stages of their development.

Parts I and II treat the cognitive functions with their meanings of recognition and selection, of truth and of value. What are the “coefficients,” the specific characters, which serve to isolate and to identify the various modes of reality—the external, the internal, the logical, the worthwhile, the good—and what are the attitudes which the self assumes to the various realities which are thus identified and mediated? These are the questions which are discussed in some detail, and for the most part very suggestively, though it must be confessed that the results themselves are frequently neither startling nor novel, and the treatment oft-times laborious and difficult. Thus,—to give merely the results in connection with the first two modes of reality just mentioned,—the characters by which mental content is apprehended as mediating external reality, whatever may be the particular cognitive process involved, are found to arise from the activities jointly of perception and memory and to be two in number. They are a relative stubbornness and uncontrollableness of the object within the mass of sense data and a “persistent ‘foreignness’ to the experience itself” (p. 25). Mind, on the other hand, is found to mean “the presence and the continuing presence of an interest; it is an affective and conative function” (p. 34). Readers of the earlier volumes will at once recognize the familiar features of outer and inner control. Professor

Baldwin, indeed, is inclined in this part of his work to recall rather freely his previous results, but the organization of his material seems to have made this unavoidable and there can be no doubt that the epistemological issues here receive greater emphasis and are more fully worked out.

A very interesting and original account is given (Chap. IV) of logical content or ideas in their mediation of reality. The "coefficient" of such content, that is, the criterion of the logical, is held to be relation—not mere relatedness or relationships, but relation in the sense of positive content actually cognized as such. The question then arises: "Is the relation 'true' in the same sense that the separate ideas are true?—do relations and ideas mediate the same or different modes of reality?" (p. 45). A trenchant criticism is given both of Green's view that "the reality of the related terms is entirely exhausted by the 'standing in relations' which knowledge or thought discloses" (p. 45) and of the antipodal doctrines of Bradley and James that "the construction of objects in relational terms tends to obscure the original 'datum' or reality," and that "the processes of logic build up a system of relational meanings as abstractions, which leave the concrete far behind" (p. 46). The one doctrine, not observing that "there are cases of cognition showing no 'standing in relation' of separate terms" and that "relation, like all other elements of meaning, undergoes real and very transforming changes in the progress of mental development," reads back into even the earliest and simplest forms of knowledge the subject-object dualism of the logical stage together with all the characteristics of logical content. In short, it commits the fallacy of the implicit. The other doctrine involves the illegitimate assumption of original, relationless data into which relations are somehow imported, thus vitiating or concealing the terms which are brought into the relations. But, objects Professor Baldwin, the relations are not superposed—they are discovered. "The process of knowledge renders, in terms of relation, the body of complications present in the content itself from the start. . . . The relatedness is as real as any other character of the whole content. Terms and relations are correlative meanings at each stage of the progress; and the tests applied to one may also be applied to confirm or to undo the other" (pp. 47f.). The opposed views just criticized, furthermore, both think of reality as content, as some specific form of existence. But reality, Professor Baldwin insists, must be construed not as content but as control; "any content may *have* reality; no content *is* reality. The reality is the intent to find the given object confirmed in being that which it is taken to be—in its own field or sphere. The meaning

for knowledge of *being real* or *having reality*" is "just the reference to a sphere, the intent to hold good somewhere" (p. 49). Two corollaries follow: (1) So far from being a single term, there are as many kinds of realities as there are fields of control mediated by mental content. (2) Relations, being as integral to mental content as are its substantive parts, mediate reality in exactly the same way. The difficulty suggested by Professor Baldwin's statement of his position is that when taken thus widely reality is deprived of all genuine meaning. All mental content, certainly, intends to hold good somewhere and refers to some sphere of being or existence. What, then, remains as the unreal? "It can only be the failure to establish a positive control," we are told (p. 49). This, however, changes the meaning of reality from the mere intent to hold good to such an intent confirmed. Questions then arise, to which no adequate answer seems attempted, as to the *modus operandi* of the confirmation and its criteria.

But "we cannot be content with adjudicating the respective claims of the varied modes of cognition taken alone, with a view to finding the 'realist' form of the real as reported by them; this would rule out in advance all a-logical or non-cognitive meanings. On the contrary, we must ask how the real feels, why it interests us, how it controls our activity and satisfies our needs, as well as how it excites our curiosity and confirms our knowledge" (p. 17). This presents the problem of Part III of the present volume, "The Logic of Practice." The development of interest and of the active life is portrayed in its larger movements in so far as these throw light on the problem of reality. Paralleling the various stages of cognition, the practical life advances from a commonness of interest due to common tendencies and emotions and to sympathy, through the "syntelic" stage (conformity to what is held by the individual to be common to himself and others, custom, conventionality, etc.), to the status of the "synomic," that which is "necessary and universal, in the sense of being imposed by each moral agent upon all" (p. 149). The presupposition of such an account is that interest is not secondary to cognition, dependent for its being and its character upon the objective content of the self, but has a relative independence. Feelings and conative states must be capable of direct revival in memory and of an organization peculiar to themselves even though this be achieved in part by the utilization of presentative content. For the evidence for this view we are referred to the recent literature inspired by the work of Ribot. Moreover, we are led to the theory by an analysis of cognition itself. "The final unit of synthesis is . . . not the mere datum or

content, but the selective interest. . . . The dominant interest . . . asserts itself from time to time, and the contents available, as terminus of this interest, are reinstated in obedience to it. This underlies the association of ideas . . ." (p. 85). In connection with this doctrine, which seems both suggestive and fruitful, reference might well have been made to the German literature on the subject and particularly to Windelband's valuable essays, *Präludien*, especially pp. 220 ff., and *Über den Einfluss des Willens auf das Denken*, *V. f. wiss. Phil.*, II (1878), 279 ff. Two further remarks. First, Professor Baldwin admits that knowledge and practice are organically and vitally related and that the theoretical and the practical are not two distinct movements (pp. 81, 106 ff.), and yet one cannot avoid the conclusion that the development of interest is presented as though it were independent of cognition, and as though these movements followed two distinct and comparatively isolated lines instead of representing the same movement of experience from two different points of view or with reference to two directions of emphasis. Secondly, there would appear to be no justification for here invoking the aid of the categories of formal logic—quantity, quality, relation, modality, and community. Being at the best characteristics of cognition, why superpose them on the affective sphere or even, particularly in a genetic account, raise the question regarding their applicability here? Ought not interest, especially if it, and not cognition, is primary, to be interpreted in the light of its own immanent factors? The subject, however, is a new and a very difficult one and, on the whole, Professor Baldwin must be credited with keen penetration in his analysis of it. The main stages of his argument are these: cognitive content is selectively determined by the processes of interest; these latter, therefore, have a certain priority and, together with affective states, they are capable of direct revival in memory and of recognition; thus they develop into "affective generals;" these are progressively organized into a body of interests or a self; this self is ejected imaginatively into other selves, thus establishing a commonness of interest (the 'syntelic' stage); through imaginative idealization the general interests are reinterpreted in terms of personal worth and thus constituted as ends valuable to all and universally binding.

Part IV of the present volume, "Semblance and the Æsthetic," turns from the logic of mediation to the problems of immediacy. It treats "those aspects of the æsthetic which have some quasi-logical or epistemological bearing, and which lend themselves finally to the discussion of the problem of reality" (p. 156). Four main subjects

are discussed: First, the characters of æsthetic experience in its differentiation from theoretical and from practical experience, its relation to play, the "æsthetic negative," as also the "negatively æsthetic" or ugly; secondly, the movements in experience which issue in æsthetic meaning—æsthetic interest, æsthetic judgment, æsthetic semblance, and æsthetic sympathy; thirdly, the æsthetic object or work of art, its detachment, completeness, formal unity, ideal suggestiveness (artistic symbolism), together with a discussion of personal idealization in art; fourthly, the springs of art, imitation and self-exhibition, both of which are held to be present in all fine art. "It is only a step to the further position, to be developed later on, that these two springs of art embody respectively the two 'controls' or spheres of reference of psychic process, the external and the inner; and that in their union the æsthetic, reducing this fundamental dualism of knowledge, issues in an experience of intrinsic immediacy" (p. 226).

This subject, "Immediacy," is introduced in Part V. In addition to a discussion of the possibility of apprehending and of describing immediate experiences (resulting affirmatively), these are classified under three modes: (1) "the immediacy of primitiveness: the intent of existence or reality that attaches to primitive or first-hand experience;" (2) "the immediacy of completion or 'transcendence' " such as that of mystic ecstasy or completely fulfilled purpose; (3) "the immediacy of 'reconciliation,' illustrated by those modes of experience in which the meaning entertained brings to a termination the oppositions and dualisms of positive mediation, such as the dualisms between truth and value, means and end, self and the external world. This is the great rôle of the semblant or imaginative functions" (p. 231). "In 'æsthetic contemplation' an immediacy of reconciliation is actually and effectively present" (p. 238). Part VI, "Outcome and Programme," brings into somewhat clearer relief this doctrine of "Pan-calism." Criticism, however, would be premature prior to its development in the concluding volume of *Thought and Things*.

Three appendices present a short account of "The Practical Syllogism," "Darwinism and Logic: A Reply to Professor Creighton" (reprinted from the *Psych. Rev.*, Nov., 1909), and "Aspects of Contemporary Thought" (reprinted from the *American Year Book* for 1910). This last appendix might well have been omitted from the present volume. It adds little or nothing that is relevant to the preceding discussions and is, furthermore, not only fragmentary but rather superficial and inaccurate.

The present volume suffers equally with the preceding ones as regards the obscurity of expression and the terminology employed. Moreover, the reader should have been spared such expressions as the following: "the fund of knowledge salted down in the keg of the actual" (p. 7); "truth . . . salted down in the body of tradition" (p. 10); "the maturation of the contents of the psychic egg" (p. 7); "the kingdom of truth has no matriculation examinations" (p. 9, n.). Misprints also are too frequent: eternal for external (p. 39, l. 9); principal for principle (p. 48, l. 28); *ipse facto* for *ipso facto* (p. 55, l. 8; p. 65, l. 34); explicite for explicit (p. 56, l. 14); form for forms (p. 61, l. 40); taking for taken (p. 72, l. 6); Volkelt's name twice appears as Volkert (p. 174), etc. It is regrettable that a work of such undoubted value as regards both subject-matter and method of treatment should be marred by defects of this kind.

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Geschichte der griechischen Ethik. Von MAX WUNDT. Zweiter Band: der Hellenismus. Leipzig, Wilhelm Engelmann, 1911.—pp. ix, 506.

No account can be given of the second volume of Dr. Wundt's learned and thoughtful work without some inclusion of the first volume, of which, unfortunately, no notice has appeared in the pages of the REVIEW. The first volume carries the history of Greek ethics through Plato. The second was intended to cover both the Hellenistic period and the period of the formation of Christian doctrine; but the writer has found this plan too extensive for a single volume and the influence of Greek ethics upon Christianity is now reserved for volume three. For Dr. Wundt Greek thought is first of all ethical and the history of Greek ethics is nothing less than a history of the Greek view of life considered from an ethical point of view. Thus it includes the view of life of Homer, Pindar, and the dramatists quite as much as that of the Greek philosophers, and Greek religion plays an important part. Of all this the work is above all an interpretation. The footnotes show that the writer is in constant touch with authority, though they do not give the reader the same opportunity to test the interpretation as is afforded, for instance, by Zeller. And there are points—for example, in the portrait of Aristotle and the picture of life in the later Hellenistic period—where one wonders whether the interpretation has not outstripped the text. Moreover, though the style is generally fluent and also elegant, it is occasionally monotonous, and the book is not free from repetition.